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POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
Appellee correctly states the standard that this court 
is to employ in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Appellee contends that the issue was never raised following 
conviction. However, the sufficiency of the evidence was raised 
at the end of the State's case and denied by the trial court. 
(Tr. 12-14 p. 43) Consequently, the issue of the sufficiency of 
the evidence was raised at the trial court level. The issue was 
unquestionably raised for the trier of fact to consider. 
Appellee argues that the evidence was sufficient to 
convict appellant of manslaughter. Appellee relies on the 
appellant's statement and the facts surrounding the shooting to 
show that appellant was aware of the risk of death to another and 
that he consciously disregarded that risk. Appellee contends 
that appellant admitted that he was aware that officers were in 
the Bates1 house at the time of the shooting. (Brief of appellee 
at p. 21) With respect to the gun shots, appellee's argument is 
that the pattern of shots and the recorded sounds of gunfire that 
were introduced into evidence indicate that appellant was 
shooting at people rather than the dogs. (Brief of appellee at 
pp. 22-23) 
Agent Garcia, who took appellant's statement, testified 
that appellant denied seeing people in the Bates' house (Tr. 12-9 
p. 85). Appellant did admit that "at best he saw movement in the 
Bate's house" (Tr. 12-9 p. 79-80). He had also stated that he 
observed the door to that house open (Tr. 12-9 p. 79-80). Garcia 
testified that appellant was questioned about the inferences 
that could be drawn from observing the movement and the door 
opening. (Tr. 12-9 p. 85) It was in answering those questions 
that appellant admitted his awareness of people being in the 
house. Appellee does not mention in its brief that the agents 
entered the Bates' house under cover of darkness and were 
attempting to conceal their presence from the Singer-Swapp family 
members. (Tr. 12-7 pp. 7-14) During the siege family members 
were observed in and around the Bates' house. (Tr. 12-2 pp. 235-
237, 250-252) These facts corroborate appellant's lack of 
awareness of the presence of the agents in that house. 
Appellee emphasizes that the pattern of bullet strikes 
indicates that appellant was not shooting at the dogs that had 
been released. Seven projectiles were located that were found to 
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have been fired from appellant's rifle. Of those projectiles 
four entered the door at the Bates' house when the door was 
partially open. (Tr. 12-13 pp. 251-252) Those are the strikes 
that make the pattern that appellee emphasizes. The other three 
strikes include one projectile that struck the Jeppson house and 
was ultimately located in Agent Don Robert's coat. (Tr. 12-8 pp. 
17-32) One projectile ricocheted off the south side of the 
Bates' house and lodged in the Jeppson's automobile. The last is 
the projectile that struck and killed Lieutenant House. (Tr. 12-
13 pp. 245-247). The totality of the circumstances indicate that 
the shots were spread over a four to five foot horizontal plane. 
As discussed in appellant's opening brief, the height of the 
strikes of the projectiles is consistent with a person firing at 
2 
dogs moving in the area in front of the Bates' house rather 
than firing at people in that house. 
Appellee also emphasizes the sequence of the shots as 
reflected in the videotape that was introduced into evidence. 
(Exhibit E-4) The grouping of the shots is correctly described 
in appellee's brief. This evidence must be considered in 
conjunction with all of the other evidence introduced at trial. 
As indicated by appellee, the first series, three shots, would 
have involved the projectiles that struck the Jeppson house, 
See the diagram of the Bate's house in the addendum of 
appellant's opening brief. 
o 
See appellant's opening brief at page 18. 
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ricocheted off the Bates' house and struck Lieutenant House. The 
second series, four shots, would have involved those projectiles 
that struck the door of the Bates' house. That sequence would be 
consistent with appellant shooting at a dog standing at a point 
higher in elevation than the doorway. If appellant would have 
been aiming at a lethal level the projectiles would have struck 
about fourteen inches higher than that level. This is because 
the sighting of the rifle, as described by Agent Crum, would have 
resulted in appellant's firing higher than his aim. (Tr. 12-13, 
p. 295) With this in mind, appellant would have had to been 
aiming at a point that would be in a person's upper leg area, 
rather than the lethal or upper body level described by appellee. 
Such a point would have been at the approximate height of the 
dogs. 
Appellee contends that appellant was shooting at the 
agents in the Bate's house when he fired his rifle on January 28, 
1988. However, considering the totality of the evidence that 
contention is improbable. It is much more reasonable that 
appellant was shooting at the dogs that were loosed to arrest the 
Swapp brothers. Likewise, the evidence is inconclusive and 
improbable as to appellant's awareness of the presence of agents 
in the Bates' house and his conscious disregard of that 
awareness. The evidence indicated that the agents had never been 
in the Bates' house before. The agents tried to secret 
themselves in the house and not reveal their presence to the 
Singer and Swapp families. (Tr. 12-7, p. 7-14) The best 
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evidence of appellant's awareness was that he observed the door 
open and saw movement in the Bates' house. (Tr. 12-9, • pp. 79-
80) Appellant denied seeing people in the house. (Tr. 12-9, p. 
85) At most, this evidence shows that appellant either failed to 
perceive or failed to recognize the risk of firing his rifle 
toward the Bates' house. In failing to perceive or recognize a 
risk, the appellant could be guilty of negligent homicide. State 
v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983). The situation in this case 
is indistinguishable from that in Dyer. In Dyer the defendant 
fired his rifle inside of his home. He was aware that his 
girlfriend was in the house, but was unaware that she was behind 
the wall at which he fired the rifle. The defendant was 
convicted of negligent homicide, and that conviction was affirmed 
on appeal. 
The evidence in this case is sufficiently inconclusive 
and improbable that reasonable minds would entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the offense of manslaughter has been established. 
Consequently, that conviction must be reversed. State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah, 1985). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENTS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO HIS ARREST WERE 
INADMISSIBLE. 
A. 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS WERE NOT 
MADE VOLUNTARILY. 
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Appellee fails to address the issue raised by appellant 
with respect to the voluntariness of the confession. The 
position taken by appellant was that due to his particular mental 
condition and circumstances, appellant was a very vulnerable 
individual. (Brief of appellant at pp. 27-30) The statements 
and actions of the officers exploited that vulnerability in such 
a manner that the appellant's statements were not the product of 
a free and rational will. See: Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 
(1985). 
Appellee's tactic was to address each factor 
individually and argue that factor in and of itself does not make 
the confession involuntary. Such a procedure is improper because 
the case law requires that the evidence must be considered in its 
totality. State v. Strain, 729 P.2d 221 (Ut. 1989) 
Circumstances that may be considered in determining the 
voluntariness of a confession include the age and intelligence of 
the defendant, the circumstances that invoked the conversation 
and the nature, import and content of statement. State v. 
Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938). 
The critical aspect of the voluntariness of appellant's 
statements are those circumstances that invoked the confession. 
Of particular importance is the content of what appellee labels 
3 
the "casual conversation" between the agents and appellent. By 
getting appellant to talk about his father, appellant could 
3 
See: Brief of appellant at pp. 28-29. 
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undoubtedly be lead into a conversation about the bombing and 
4 
shootout. 
As discussed in appellant's opening brief this method 
of questioning involved both trickery and coercion upon this 
particular appellant. That would render the confession 
involuntary and therefore inadmissible. 
B. 
THE AGENTS FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY 
HONOR APPELLANT'S ASSERTION OF HIS 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF 
INCRIMINATION. 
Appellee correctly focuses on the issue of whether the 
agents scrupulously honored appellant's assertion of his 
privilege against self incrimination. Appellant had been 
properly warned about his right to counsel and privilege against 
self incrimination. He then signed a waiver. Shortly after 
signing a waiver, appellant indicated that he did not want to 
talk to the agents. (R. 1476, p. 202) If the agents engaged in 
interrogation of appellant then the assertion of the privilege 
was not scrupulously honored. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1986); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
"Interrogation" was defined in Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980), as express questioning or its functional 
equivalent. The functional equivalent of questioning is defined 
as words and actions by the officers that those officers should 
See Point II. B., infra. 
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. Appellee characterizes the exchange between the agents 
and appellant as "casual conversation." However, appellee never 
discussed the content of those conversations. Just because one 
party characterizes a verbal exchange as "casual conversation" 
does not make it such. The court must look to the content of the 
conversation to determine if it was merely something "casual" and 
voluntary or if it was interrogation. 
As previously discussed the agents talked about their 
own families and expressed their confusion over the causes of the 
entire situation. (R. 1476, p. 216) All of the communications 
from the Singer household in the two previous weeks related to 
the death of appellant's father and how that incident related to 
5 
the revelations that inspired the bombing and siege. Enticing 
appellant into talking about his family in general and his father 
in particular would reasonably lead to statements about the 
bombing, siege and the shooting. Such a discussion would be 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This 
"casual conversation" was the functional equivalent of express 
questioning. This "casual conversation" was therefore 
interrogation as described in Innis. The officers failed to 
scrupulously honor appellant's assertion of his privilege against 
self incrimination. The statements made as a result of that 
interrogation were inadmissible. 
5 
See footnote 12 in Appellant's opening brief. 
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